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INTRODUCTORY.
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After a thorough invest igation of the effects of a
failure by the vendor to change possession, more esperially
as it related to personalty,

it

will be found to occupy

a very prominent place in the law of fraudutlent conveyanThis class of cases arises where the creditor has

ces.

levidd on the goads in the, possession of the debtor,

and

the vendee comes forward and attempts to claim such goods.

The daoctrine has its faundation in the Statute of 1 ,Elizabeth ca.

5, which is the foundation of all our madern

statutes and judicial decisions on the subject of fraudulent conveyances in this counitry.

BY its provisions all

conveyances and dispositions of property, real or personal
made with the intent to delay,

hinder,

or defraud creditors

are void and fraudulent as against such creditors.
The fact that the vendor remained in possession of the
goods is

acknowledged by all jurisdictions to be evidence

of the fraudulent intent, but the coutts are far from being
harmonious as to what weight shoulId be given to such evidence.

Some courts hold that retention of possession is

only prima facie evidence of the fraudulent intent and is

a question for the jury to deeide; while others hold that
the mere retention of possession is

fraud per se and a

question of law for the aourt to decide.
far the prevailing rule; the latter is

The former is by

followed by Pennsyl-

vania and a few other States.
Since the courts of Pennsylvania hold that retention
of possession is
to decide,

it

fraud per se and a question for the ecurT

will be the purpose of this article to trace

the Pennsylvania decisions on this point,-giving the reasons for their holding, and presenting such modifications
of the broad general rule as the public policy of this
State seems to demand.

RETENTION OF POSSESSION AS EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
IN PENNSYLVANIA.
-...- 000--ACTUAL CHANGE OF POSSESSION REQUIRED.
retention of possession,

in Pennsylvania,

date from the decision of Clow v Wood,

The subJeet of
may be said to

5 S.& R.275,

1819 ).

Chief Justice Sharswood in 3c Kibbin v Martin, 64 Pa. 552,
has justly aalled Clow v Woad,
of Pennsylvania,
It

was said in

on fraud in

Clow v Wood,

"the imagna charta of the law

the transfer of possession".
"that the Statute of 1

Eliz.

does not in words declare a conveyance of goods fraudulent
where the vendor remains in possession- but in general terms
renders void all conveyances made to the end, purpose,
intent of defrauding creditors".

and

This case established

the broad prilcwple that retention of possession of goods
by the vendor,

after the title

ferred to another,

is

to such goods has been trans-

conclusive evidence of fraud on the

vendor's creditors or innocent purchasers from him.
irmmaterial whether or not a fraudulent

It is

intent existed: the

mere fact of remaining in possession of the goods with the
vendee's consent,
delivery,

is

if

such goods are reasonably capable of

fraud per se and a quest ion of law for the

2

court to decide.
In

all the cases bearing on this subject

it

is

argued

that publi c policy should induce such a comprehensive construction of the Statute of 13 Eliz.

as to take in

all cases,

except those where the goods are incapable of delivery, or
where the change of possession would defeat fair
objects to be affected thereby.

and honest

The earlier cases of Wilt

v Franklin, 1 Binn. 502; and Dawes v Cope, 4 Binn. 258, acknowledge the principle that retention of possession was
fraud per se,

but they confined its

application to narrow

The courts have always clung to the decision of

limits.

Clow v Wood, 5 S.&R.275, and it is now an inflexible rule
which makes it fraud per se if

the possession does not fol-

low as well as accompany the transfer:
W. & S.
"if
is

147; or as is

said in

Young v Ma Clure,

Streeper v Eckert,

2 Wh.

2

382,

there be any principle established by these cases,

it

that a transfer of personal property unaccompanied by a

corresponding transmutation of possession is
creditors".

void as against

To the sane effect see Babb v Clemson,

II

S.

&

R. 419
If

A sells goods to 13, and A remains in

the goods,

and they are capable of delivery,

possession of
such goods are

3

and the sale

liable to levy and sale by the creditors of A,

as a matter of

between A and B will be declared fraudulent

kept and fed the horse in
the sale:

v Me Clure,
5 Pa.

the same stable as he did before
5 Watts 483,

Carpenter v Mayer,

kept goods in

320,

the same house.
150,

2 W. & S.

sale of timber:

canal boat;

Bar v Boyles,

Hulbert v Simons,

20 W. N.

Milne v Henry,
warrant the facts in
having failed,

40 Pa.

where the vendor

To the same effect

see Young

sale of oxen; Cadbury v Nolan,
14 Pa.

Forsyth v M,11athews,

Dewart v Clement,

sale of bar-fixtures;

where the vendonk

5 Wharton 545,

See Ioofner v Clark,

law.

96 Pa.

31,

C. 15,

100,

413, sale of

48 Pa.

sale of machinery;

sale of safe.

31, being a complicated case,

being set out in

full.

A,

may

a merchant.,

bought goods on credit as agent of his wife.

These goods were not paid for out of her own money.

She

now sold the store to her brother B, the consideration being a $500.

note: but no money on it was paid.

No inven-

tory of the goods were made, the same sign remained in the
window,

same clerks were employed,

visible change of possession.
tending to business in

and there was no outward
the store at-

A remained in

the same manner as before the sale.

Goods were levied upon by the creditors of A

.

Held,

that

4

purchased was not paid for by the

as the property first
wife's own money,

she had no title

ownership was in her husband A,

to the goods,

but the

and the sale or pretended

sale to B was fraudulent because A remained in

possession

of the goods.
All these cases come to the conclusion that retention
of possession is

fraud per se and a question of law for the

court to decide.

They say that the possession of personal

property is

prhma facie evidence of ownership,

every man is

der the appearance of this ownership,
in

regerding him as still

and that un-

being the owner,

and in

justified
giving

him credit or extending indulgence to him on account of it.
In

Streeper v ERk.ert,

2 Wharton 367,

it

is

argued that if

it

were permitted under such circumstances to withdraw the
property from the seller's

creditors,

it

would work injus-

tice to such creditors, because it may be fairly presumed
to have influenced them in
ever,

it

is

giving credit to the party.

How-

not necessary that the creditor should assert

or prove that he was deceived by the false appearance of

ownership.

"

It

is

ir~material whether or not the creditor

trusted the debtor on the strength of the goods being in
the debtor's possession".

Martin v Machoit,

10 S. & R.

214.

5

The mischief is

tho swne because it

would often be a very

difficult task for one nan to prove what induced him to give
credit to another.

As a general rule, however, the poss-

ession of goods by the debtor has always been a material
point in

inducing cr edit.

The Pennsylvania courts have always been very favorable to creditors and bona fide purchasers.
therefore maintained the doctrine that in

They have

order to prevent

the community from being deceived by an apparent ownership
in property,

after the title

transferred,

the person in

to such property has been
whom the title

rests must take

the property into his exclusive possession,

or in

some pub-

lie way exercise rights of ownership

over it.

dee allows the property to remain in

the hands of the ven-

dor,

the vendor's creditors can seize it.

applies to conditional

sales,

and if

If the ven-

The same rule

the vendor delivers

possession of the property to the vendee with a reservation
that the vendor may recover the property upon the failure
of the vendee to pay all the purchase money, it becomes li-

able to execution by the vendee's creditors: Rose v Story
1 Pa.

1bc; Waidron v llatipt, 52 Pa. 4O83

64 Pa. 499; Emver v Van Griesen,

I-aak v Tinderman,

C W. N. C. 363: Stradtfelt

6

v Huntsman,
But if

92 Pa.

53; Brunswclk

v Hoover,

A the owner of goods leaves them in

of B as bailee of the goods,

95 Pa.

503.

the possession

such goods are not liable to

levy and sale by the creditors of B: Edward's Appeal, 105
Pa.

109.

In

order to determine whether the contract

is

one of bailment or conditional

sale,

from the terms of the contract

the intent of the parties:

Enlow v Klien,

79 Pa.

488.

It

we must ascertain,

may be convenient for the

parties to agree that the vendor should remain in
ion,

or in

possession,

possess-

a conditional sale that the vendee should have
and these contracts will be enforced by the

courts as between the parties- but when the rights of third
persons are affected by giving credit to the vendor when
he retains possession of the goods,

or by giving credit to

the vendee when such vendee has possession of the goods under a conditional sale,
are paramount.

the rights of such third persons

Heretofore I have been treating of the

sale as being declared fraudulent
of the vendor in possession,

and I have shown that where

the vendor remained in possession,
as to his creditors.

as against the creditors

the sale was fraudulent

We found also that the same rule ap-

plied to the vendee in possession under a conditional sale.

7

Suppose now, that the vendor in possession sells the goods
to an innocent third party who takes the goods into his own
possession.

Will such third party get good title as against

the first purchaser?

In Shaw v Levy, 17 S. & R. 101, A
A now

sold goods to B, but A retained possession of them.

sold the same goods to C, a bona fide purchaser, who took
possession of the goods.

In a suit between B and C to de-

termine who was to have the goods, the court held that the
goods belonged to C.

"As between the first purchaser and

the vendbr the property belonged to the purchaser; but when
it passed to the hands of a bona fide second purchaser,
without notice, it would be against sound policy to allow
the first purchaser to recover".

This decision was based

on the theory that where one of two innocent parties must
suffer, he who is the cause of the loss must bear it.

The

vendee having permitted the vendor to remain in possession,
the vpndor was enabaled to cormit fraud on innocent third
parties, and the vendee must bear the loss.

The, cases say

this principle has its foundation in the common law, and is

not necessarily dependirng on the Statute of Eliz.

In Davis

v Pugh, 32 Pa. 242, G sold: lumber ,to-M who inmmediately .made
a contract with G to run it to market.

It was left with

S

G until he started to run it; G on the way sold it

The decisions are followed in

Held, B got good title.
Grawford v Davis,
Pa.

372.

to B.

99 Pa.

576; and Miller v Browarsky,

130

The same rule applies where the vendee in poss-

ession under a conditional

sale,

iooent third person.

is

"It

sells the goods to an in-

the sene with a conditional

sale; for the retention of possession is
tention of a lien on personal property".
52 Pa. 408.

In

Stradtfelt v Huntsman,

and took possession of goods,

essential to reWaldron v Haupt,
92 Pa.

53, A bought

payment to be made on instaljl

There was a written contract to the effect

ment plan.
that the titleto

the goods was to remain in

the payment of the full purchase price.

the vendor till

Before the pur-

chase price was paid A sold the goods to B , an innocent
third party,

who had no notice of the reservation of title

in the original vendor.

Held, B got good title, and the

first contract was fraudulent as to innocent third person.

WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF POSSESSION?

eral rule is
ession,

The gen-

that there must be an actual change of poss-

but there are numnerous occasions on which an actual

change is

not required.

In such cases constructive poss-

9

The delivery must be actual and

sufficient.

ession is

such as the nature of the property sold,

or the eircumstan-

ces of the sale will reasonably admit.

Separation of the

property from the vendor's possession means only a change
of his relation to it

and consists in

as owner,

the sur-

render and transfer of his power over it to the vendee. If,
the goods are capable of actual delivery a con-

however,

structive delivery will not be enough: Bellingsley v White,
But it often becomes difficult to determine

59 Pa. 464.

whether or not certain acts will warrant a finding of eonstructive change of possession.
to decide the question,

In such cases the jury is
doing so it

and in

sideration the character of the property,
transaction,

the position of the parties,

use of the property.
Ilc Clure v Folney,
210,

it

stored in

107 Pa.

a warehouse,

the nature of the
and the intended

See Grawford v Davis, 99 Pa. 576;
414.

said that goods in

is

takes into eon-

In

may be delivered by the delivery of

the hands of a bailee is

tion creditor,

or

the hands of a carrier,

A sale

the bill of lading or the warehouseman's receipt.
of goods in

78 Pa.

Bond v Bunting,

although there is

good against an execu-

no actual delivery,

vendor does not retake possession'Tinton v Butz,

if

7 Pa.

the

89.

10

To the same effect see Whigham's Appeal,
Barr v Reitz,

53 Pa.

256,

63 Pa.

194.

In

the owner of household goods sold

them, moved out of the house in which they were, and delivHeld, "whether the goods

ered the keys to the purchaser.
were removed from the house in

which the owner remained,

or the owner removed from the house in which the goods remained,

the visible relation between them was b~roken and

the public was put on its duty to inquire".
Robinson,

24 Pa.

9,

In Hugus v

there was a sale of a store,

continuing to do business

in

the old stand.

the vendee

The court in

determining whether there was a sufficient change of possession said,"is it- contrary to public policy for one who
buys a store of goods, to continue to do business in the
same place"?
possession.
Schell,

55 Pa.

It

was held to be a sufficient change of

To the same effect
393,

where it

is

the case of Benford v

was held that the delivery of

the keys of a safe and the keys of the room in which it was,
would be a sufficient delivery of possession.

But where

there are several piles of lumber that are incapable of delivery,

they should b~e marked at once with the name of the

owner or they will be liable to levy by the vendor's creditors:

Long v Knapp 54 Pa. 514.

In all these cases there

11

is

change of possession if

held to be a sufficient

the ven-

dee will exercise such a control over the goods as will
reasonably indicate to all the fac* of a change of owner.Me Kibbin v Martin

Chief Justice Sharswood in

ship.

357,

64 Pa,

surs s up some of the cases of constructive
these words; "if

possession in

capable of delivery,
enough.

As in

the articles of sale are not

then a constructive delivery will be
goods in

the case of a vessel at sea,

a
See

warehouse, a raft of lumber, a kiln of bricks, etc."
also Cadbury y Nolan 53 Pa.
5390

520;

Chase v Ralston ,

0 Pa.

Clow v Wood, 5 S. & R. 275; Renninger v Spartz, 128
"This rule is

Pa. 524.

applied as the circumstances re'I

quire in

order to make its,

application just:

Stephans v

Gifford 137 Pa. 219.

POSSESSION MUST BE TAIKN WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AND
BE CONTINUOUS.

The decisions are uniform in

holding that

the change of possession must take place at the time of the
sale,

or within a reasonable time thereafter.

ter v Mayer,
As to what is

5 Watts 43

Babb v Clemon,

10 S.

See Carpen& R.

419.

a reasonable time depends upon the circumr-

stances of each particular case.

If

there is

a sale of a

12

vessel at sea, the possession should be taken as soon as it
conveniently can after its arraval:
Yates 33

Morgan v Biddle, 1

if the vendee takes possession before execution

was ismed against vendor it will be sufficient: Woofsmith
v Cope, 5 Wharton 58; where A bought household goods from
B, and B was going to occupy the same house, the fact that
A remained in possession six days would not make it fraud
per se: Barr v Reitz, 53 Pa. 256;

in sale of household fur-

niture the purehasers were looking for a house for three
weeks after the sale, held, that a judgment taken out eight
months after such sale could not be collected out of such
goods:

Smith v Stern, 17 Pa. 360.

The change of possession must be continuous in the
vendee and if the property gets back to the possession of
the vendor it will be liable to execution by vendor's creditors.

Where a vendee of oxen, after keeping them in his

possession a few hours, returns them to the vendor as a security for a loan, they are liable to levy and sale by the
vendor's creditors:

Young v Ma Clure, 2 W. & S. 147.

"In

all cases where the delivery has been temporary and followed by a return to the seller, the law regards it as colorable and fraudulent in law" :

Garman v Cooper, 72 Pa. 32.

13

There is
law,

in

a retention of possession in

the meaning of the

all ordinary cases where the property comes back

to the late owner shortly after the transaction in
Miller v Garman,

69 Pa.

134; Me Clure v Folney,

question:

107 Pa.414:

but if the goods remain in open and notorious possession of
the vendee for a considerabole length of time, and then get
back to the possession of the vendor, the court cannot declare such transaction void in
Dunlap v Bournonville,
Pa.

26 Pa.

296; Bond v Bronson,
If

the vendee,

favor of vendor's creditors.
72; Mc Marlan v English,

80 Pa.

74

360.

after a delivery of the goods,

allows

the vendor to again have possession of such goods, and the
vendor sells them to a bona fide purchaser, such purchaser
will get good title:

Davis v Bigler,

CONCURRENT POSSESSION.
continuous,
ession is

and exclusive in

62 Pa.

242.

The transfer must be actual,
the vendee;

evidence of fraud.

"It

is

concurrent poss-

mere mockery to put

another person to keep possession jointly with the former

owner":
43 Pa.

Bab1b v Clemson,
lO6

10 S.

Miller v Garman,

Warman v Kraner,

73 Pa.

379,

& R.. 428
69 Pa.

135.

see Bawn v Kellar,
Judge Agnew in

defines concurrent possession

14

to be, "where the control and use of the goods by the vendor and vendee are so mixed up and confused as to leave the
'question of possession uncertain".

If the vendor occupies

the same relation to the property as he did before the sale,
the court will pronounce it fraudulent per se.

See Hoof-

per v Clark, 5 Wharton 545; Brawn v Kellar, 43 Pa. 104;
Stellwagon v Jeffries, 44 Pa. 407; Snyder v Shuh, 10 WN-O.
136; Mc Kibbin v Martin, 64 Pa, 352.
But there are cases of concurrent possession where the
court will not pronounce such possession as being fraudulent per se;

as for example, where there was a sale from

father to son,

and the son having removed the goeds to an-

other place where his father continued t6 live with him,
and do small jobs about the premises.

In such a case "it

certainly was not necessary for the son to turn his father
out of doors":

Mc Vicker v May,

3 Pa.

224.

In Hugus v

Robinson, 24 Pa. 9, the vendee purchased the drugstore for
his son, the son having been a clerk of the vendor.

The

sign having been changed, the son took possession and em-

ployed the vendor as manager.

Held, not a concurrent poss-

ession as to make the transaction fraudulent.

In cases of

postnuptial settlements by the husband to the wife, there

15

Larkin v McMullin,

is necessarily a concurrent possession:

49 Pa. 29, or where the wife bought goods from the husband
in

good faith,

and she paid for them with her

Skinner v Iroh,
26 Pa.

72,

4 Pa.

See also Dunlap v Bournonville,

where the vendor remained as foreman; Billings-

by v White,

59 Pa.

464,

Ziegler v Hendrick,
in

204.

own money:

where vendor remained as clerk;

106 Pa.

87,

the store; Rothermel V Marr,

where vendor had desk room
98 Pa.

285,

where vendor

and vendee were brother and sister living in the same house,
In

all

these cases the court would not pronounce the con-

current possession as fraudulent per ee,

but if

there were

any facts tending to show that the vOndor retained any benefibial interest
till

in

the business,

to pay his own debts,

or took money from the

or that such of the proceeds of

the business went to him as was beyond a reasonable compen-

sation for his services,- these were reasonable questions
of fact for the jury and it might be justified in finding
that the transfer was not bona fide.
20 W.N.C.

See Stull v Weigle,

98.

This class of cases is not looked upon very favorably.
bcy the courts and it

will take but very slight evidence to

have them declared fraudulent.

Judge Agnew,

in Barr v

16

Reitz, 53 Pa. 258, said Dunlap v Bournonville, and Hugus
supra,

v Robinson,
principles".
Sharswood,

"stand on the very outer edge of settled

In Mc Kibbin v Martin, 64.Pa. 381, C. J.

after acknowledging that the vendee may employ

the vendor as his agent in
"I

conduating the business,

said,

frankly confess that I have not regarded this line of

decisions with favor",

lie followed these cases not be-

cause he believed they were just,

but because,

"I

have been

too long an the bench C 25 yrs.)Inot to have learned the
lesson- that a judge has no right to adhere to his favorite
opinions after they have been reversed or overruled".

JUDICIAL SALES.

Hereatofore I have been treating of

the retention of possession after private sales.

We now

come to a discussion of the cases wherein the judgment debetor,

after a sale on execution,

retains possession of the

goods with the consent of the vendee,

and we find a dis-

tinction between private sales and judicial sales.
theory,

The

on which retention of possession by the vendor is

in a private sale declared fraudulent,

is

that such sales

are known only to the inmmediate parties; but in a judicial
sale every person is

bound to take notice of the transfer

17

of the title, and hence there can be no uncertainty as to
who is the true owner.

Therefore a retention of possess-

ion by the former owner of a chattel sold at sheriff's sale
is not an index of fraud:

Walter v Mc Clellan, 4 Dallas

2083 Staller v Kirkpatrick, I Mona,43G; Bellas v M

Carty,

10 Watts 44; Meyers v Harvey, 2 P. & W. 478; Lathrop v
Wightman, 41 Pa. 297; Craig',s Appeal 77 Pa. 443;

Smith V

Cristman, 91 Pa. 430; Miller v Irvine, 94 Pa. 405.

This

class of.cases often arises where the purchaser is a relative of the judgment debtor and the latter is allowed to
retain possession of the goods as a matter of charity or
benevolence.

The permission of the debtor to remain in

possession, "is certainly a humane and generous arrangement;
and if done in good faith, deserves commendation rather
than censure":

Rolard v Brooke, 127 Pa. 144.

But if the

goods are bought in with the debtor.'s money, the goods will
be liable to subsequent executions against him:
Germant, 1

Pa. 515;

Walter v

or if one buys cloth at a sheriff's

sale and leaves it with the debtor to be made up for debt-

or's own use with the understanding to account to the purchaser for the price, it is a sale to the debtor and is
liable to execution:

Dic2 v Lindsay, 2 Grant 431, and Dicki

18

v Cooper,

sumption and Is
consumption,

it

the chattel

217- or if

24 Pa.

left

is

capable of con-

with the debtor for his own use and

becomes liable to creditors:

Divil, 11 Pa. 264.

If

Heitzman v

cannot be shown that the pur-

it

chaser meant to relinquish all claim over the goods when he
allowed the debtor to remain in possession, the subsequent
creditors may seize such goods: but if there Is only a mere
possibility of the debtor. repurehasing the goods,
itors have no claim on them:

his cred-

Maymes v Atwater, 88 Pa. 496;

Bisbing v Third Nat. Bank, 95 Pa. 78.

The purchase and

retention of possession must both be made in good faith.
If

then,

the judgment creditor is

moumt of his debt in full,

subsequently paid the a-

the goods in

possession of the

judgment debtor are liable to levy by another creditor:
Scott v Chancellar, 20 Pa. 195.

Neither is

there a pre-

sumption of fraud where the debtor remains in possession:
Walter v Germant,

13 Pa.

515,

for "the law does not repeal

such charity by any presumption of fraud so as to authorize
the seizure of those goods as the property of the debtor"..

Maynes v Atwater,

ASSI GNMETS.

88 Pa.

476.

At a very early date the courts were

19

called upon to decide whether or not assignments for the
benefit of creditors were to be placed in the same category
with judicial'sales.
10 S.

Neville,
251,

In the early cases of Cunningham v

& R. 204;

and Hower v Geeseman,

17 S.

& R.

the court held that retention of possession by the as-

signor was fraudulent per se.

Assignments were placed on

the same footing with private sales- the court citing Clow
v Wood,

5 S.

& R.

275,

membered that the latter
signment,

with approval.

But it

must be re-

case was not the case of an as-

but was the case of retained possession by the

mortgagor of a chattel mortgage.

That retention of poss-

ession by the assignor was declared fraudulent

in

the early

cases, can be accounted for only by the fact that they were
decided. but a few years after Clow v Wood.
seemed to be so extensive in
cial sales and assignments;

its

This case

terms as to include judi-

but as has been shown by the

late cases,

this intended strictness has not been rigidly

enforced.

An honest assignment to secure a pro rata dis-

tribution among all the creditors should be fostered.

If

the goods are to be held in °trust for all the creditors,
nothing would be more unju~st than to allow some one of themi
to levy on the goods and have the assignment declared fraud,

20

One

ulent because the assignor remained in possession.

creditor has no more claim on the debtor's goods than another.

Nothing can be more honest on the part of the

debtor,

than to pay all his creditors alike by a general

assignment for their benefit,

and the law should not,

demand a change of possession of the goods if

fore,

in

have an equal interest

them.

all

These early decisions may

have influenced the Legislature somewhat,

for in

Act was passed requiring an inventory of all
goods to be recorded within thirty
signment.

there-

1836 an

the assigned

days from the day of as-

The retention of possession in

a private bill

of sale is made fraudulent on account of the secrecy of its
nature: but since the recording act for assignments, this
objection is

removed,

judicial sales.

It

and assignments are now placed with
is

the publicity of the transaction

that puts them on the same footing with Judicial
Dallai v Fitler, 6 W. & S.
Maitland 5 W. & S.

309,

323; or,

as is

sales:

said in Fitler

v

"there can no more be a sham sale

by a general assignment than there can be by an execution".

Since the Act of 1836 all persons are held to have constructive notice that the assignee has the title
goods,

and the early

to the

cases of Cunningham v Neville,

21

10

S.

& R. 204;

and Howes v Geeseman,
is

At the present time it

overruled.

17 S.

& R.

251,

are

well sattled that

the mere fact of the assignor. remaining in possession of
the goods,

after the assignment,

is

not fraudulent-

either

during the thirty days allowed for recording or after the
assign ent is

recorded:

Mitchell's Appeal,

Fitler

2 W. & S.

Watts 44; Klapp's Assignmesignment takes effect
instrument

and it

v Miaitland,
253;

Bellas v Me Carty,

v Shirk,

14 S.

13 Pa.

588.

309V

10

The as-

immediately on the execution of the

makes no difference whether or not the as-

signee had notice of the assignment:
son,

5 W. & S.

Wiekersham v Nickol-

& R. 118; neither will the assigrnent

cause there has been a failure to appoint
such case equity will appoint one:

fail

an assignee,

Mark's Appeal,

bein

85 Pa.

231.
The assignment must be bona fide in order that the assignor may remain in possession.
the assignor in possession is

But the mere fact that

employed by the assignee to

manage the business or take care of the goods is not fraud-

ulent in itself:

Deckard v Case,

5 Watts 22, because "it

would frequently be disastrous to the creditors jif the assignor was excluded from the possession and management of

22

property":

o309.
Fitler v Maitland 5 W. & S.

CHATTELi MORTGAGES.

At connon law all sales, pledges,

and mortgages of personal property were void as to third
parties, umless the possession acaompanied and went with
the vendee, pledgee or mortgagee.

Where the mortgagor

retains possession of the goods and exercises a power to
dispose of them for his own benefit,

it

is

an effectual

shield to a dishonest debtor, for such authority is inconsistent with the idea of a security; and if

there can he

no real certain security, there can be no certain lien.
Even under the recording statutes they may work an injustice on innocent purchasers from the mortgagor in possession, because it is against the custom and general understanding that purchasers should exanine the records previous to purchasing personal property.
The common law idea of chattel mortgages has undoubtedly secured a firm foothold in Pennsylvania, for it is
said in Euwer v Van Gliesin, 6 W.N.C.

363,

that "in Penn-

sylvania, chattel mortgages are not sanctioned.

The cozn-

mon law rule prevails that one man shall not have a lien
on personal property owned by and in possession of another

23

as against oreditors and innocent purchasers".
Wood,

5 S.

& R. 275,

In

Clow v

A executed a chattel mortgage to B.

A remained in possession and continued to exercise ownership over the goods..

Subsequently A's creditors levied

on the goods and sold them. under execution.

Held, that

"the mortgagor's possession under the transaction was
fraudulent per se and void against bona fide creditors".
If

then,

the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to remain in

possession,

he does so at his peril,

for it

is

said,

"that

a mortgagee out of possession has no priority over a creditor who has obtained a lien":
4 W. N.

C. 264.

See also Fry v Miller,

mark Association v Bolster,
tends to contracts made in
in

Merchant's Bank v R'y.

92 Pa.

45 Pa.

123.

4410

Co.

Bis-

This rule ex-

other States; and a mortgagee

Maryland who permits the mortgagor to retain possession

of the mortgaged goods knot found in Maryland), and the
mortgagor brings them into Pennsylvania where he disposes
of them to a bona fide purchaser,
title

If,

to the property:

however,

such purchaser gets good

MacCabe v Blymyre,

9 Phila.R.

the purchaser has notice of the mortgage,

cannot claim the goods as against the mortgagee:
Nonemaker,

78 Pa.

501.

625.

he

Cobb v

24

Heretofore we have been treating of mortgages not provided for by statute.

The Legislature has passed several

Acts allowing the mortgagor of chattels to retain possession of them on complying with certain requisites of the
statutes.

Thus by the Act of 1855 it was made lawful for

the lessees of collieries, manufactories and like premises
to mortgage their leases,

machinery,

etc.

By the Act of
were allow-

1876 chattel mortgages for not less than $5O0.
ed on saw-logs,

sawed lumber,

rels or reservoirs,
having expired in

iron ore,

laths,

canal boats,

five years by its

oil in

shingles,
etc.

This Act

own limntation,

it

be found subsequently re-enacted by the Act of 1887.
the Act of 1891,

bar-

will
By

chattel mortgag es for not less than $100.

may be given on cement,

boilers,

engines,

oil,

sheets, gas and artesian wells supplies, etc.

nails,

iron

Such mort-

gages must be in writing signed by the mortgagor and duly
acknowledged the same as deeds and mortgages of real estate.

They are to be recorded and remain in

effect one

year unless renewed within thirty days previous to their

expirat ion.
The mortgagor of all such articles enumerated by
these statutes may retain possessipn of such articles and

25

the mortgage will be good against his areditors and bona
fide purchasers from him, the fact of recording being a
constructive notice to everybody that the articles are
mortgaged.

CHATTELS REAL.

Chattels real form another except-

ion to the general rule that retention of -possession is
It has on several occas-

conclusive evidence of fraud.

ions been argued that chattels real should be placed on
the same footing with chattels personal.
case of Penna. v Kirkpatrick,

I Add.

strong dicta to that effect.
that a lease of lands is

In

the early

193, there was very

The court in this case said

considered as a chattel-

and a

conveyance of a lease unattended with possession is fraudulent.
Pa. 65.

This case is criticlsed in Williams v Downing, 18
Judge Chambers said, "much as we respect the

opinion of the learned judge in
law,

yet,

that case on a question of

without his usual. accuracy and discrimination,

he confounded the law in

that of chattels real".

relation to personal

The rule as laid down in the dic-

ta in Pennsylvania vs Downing,
the contrary it

chattels with

was never followed; while on

has been decided on several occasions that

26

retention of possession by the lessor,
lease,

was not fraudulent:

Avery v Street,

after a sale of the

Ludwig v Highly,

5 Pa.

6 Watts 247; Alletown Bank v Beck,

409; Williams v Downing,

18 Pa.

141;
49 Pa.

60; Benninger v Statz,

Pa. 524.
-..THE END.---
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